

DRAFT Final
(10 December 1962)TO: Senior War Planner,
[Redacted]

INFO: [Redacted]

FROM: Chief, WPS

SUBJECT: Matters dealing with Implementation of
the Command relationships Agreement (CRA)

ACTION REQUIRED: For information and general guidance

1. Purpose: This memorandum announces an exchange of memoranda between Chief, KUBARK, and Chairman, JBTRUTH, regarding implementation of the Command Relationships Agreement (CRA). It also acquaints Senior War Planners with Headquarters thinking which they may use as a basis for discussing the subject with military commanders and staffs.

2. Background:

a. The CRA contains the principles under which KUBARK supports unified and specified commanders in a wartime situation where American forces are actively engaged. A basic principle is that, upon implementation of CRA, a KUBARK Force is activated under a KUBARK Commander, and the Force comes under operational command of the military commander in chief on the same command level as the theater Army, Navy and Air Force components present in the theater of operations.

b. The KUBARK elements to be included in the Force are those which are assigned by the Chief, KUBARK, and his technical and administrative control over the Force is analogous to that exercised by the Military Service Secretaries and Chiefs over their service components.

c. The timing and method of implementing CRA and activating the KUBARK Force is not a part of the Agreement. Headquarters interpretation is that the CRA should be implemented when American Forces are actively engaged in combat operations in a wartime situation.

d. Chief, KUBARK has the authority to direct the activation of a KUBARK force when, in his judgment, the situation requires it and the military authorities concur.

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3. Summary of Memoranda Exchanged between Chief, KUBARK, and

Chairman, JBTRUTH:

a. In a memorandum dated 17 April 1962, Chief KUBARK, notified Chairman, JBTRUTH, that KUBARK review of plans in support of military operations indicated that a further definition of the timing of the implementation of CRA is necessary for planning purposes. He also pointed out that the implementation should be before the outbreak of hostilities and related to national and military planning alert systems. Chief, KUBARK, however, felt that implementation should not be automatic because considerations at the time might dictate that it would not be in the national interest to have the CRA in effect, particularly if it appeared that war might be averted. For this reason, Chief, KUBARK, proposed that:

(1) It be accepted, for planning purposes, that CRA will be implemented at DEFCON 1.

(2) At the time appropriate authority is considering announcing a DEFCON 1 Chairman, JBTRUTH, and Chief, KUBARK should jointly determine whether CRA should be implemented. Such a joint determination for implementation of CRA at DEFCON 1 recognizes the difference between planning and the degree to which such plans can be implemented in an existing situation.

b. By memorandum dated 12 August 1962, Chairman, JBTRUTH, agreed that for planning purposes a point in time prior to the outbreak of hostilities should be determined for implementation of CRA. Chairman, JBTRUTH, however, believed it necessary that CRA be implemented automatically at announcement of a world-wide DEFCON 1 because military commanders should have available to them, at that time, the KUBARK Forces which have been planned for them. In addition, the memorandum also suggested that Chairman, JBTRUTH, and Chief, KUBARK, establish a procedure for jointly making a determination to activate the KUBARK Force in contingency situations short of general war regardless of whether or not DEFCON 1 had been announced. Chairman, JBTRUTH, also asked that KUBARK identify in its plans those KUBARK elements which would constitute the force to be activated upon implementation of CRA; and if Chief, KUBARK, concurred with the concept, unified-specified commanders would be directed to:

(1) Require KUBARK Force commanders to include Force Tabs in their KUBARK Supporting Plans.

(2) Include in their plans provisions for furnishing a recommendation to JBTRUTH concerning the activation of the KUBARK Force, or elements thereof, whenever consideration is given by them or the JBTRUTH to implementing an operations plan.

c. By memorandum dated 8 October 1962, Chief, KUBARK, answered the above memorandum and concurred in JBTRUTH's concepts except for that portion requiring automatic implementation of CRA upon announcement of a world-wide DEFCON 1. Chief, KUBARK, pointed out that at the time the announcement of a world-wide DEFCON 1 is being considered the need for a joint determination for implementing CRA is essential. Because ~~the~~ the relationships now existing between unified-commanded commanders and other ODYOME departments or agencies operating within their respective areas may not be disrupted to the same degree on a world wide basis. We also believe that if an appreciable time lag marks the transition from peace to war, political negotiations will be continued. During this transitional period, it may well be that KUBARK can best carry out its responsibilities as an integrated agency responding to national authorities. Chief KUBARK stated that it is for these reasons and until a decision is made as to the degree of implementation of military plans, the role of KUBARK within individual military theaters should be the result of a joint determination by Chairman, JBTRUTH, and Chief, KUEARK.

4. Joint Implementation Agreements:

a. As of this date, Chairman, JBTRUTH, has not responded to Chief KUBARK's suggestion to eliminate the provisions for automatic implementation of CRA upon announcement of a world-wide DEFCON 1. We have, however, received indications of JBTRUTH concurrence on those portions of the exchange of memoranda which pertain to a joint determination to implement CRA and activate the KUABRK Force in contingency situations short of general war. Such indications have emerged from correspondence between CINCLANT and Chairman, JBTRUTH, coordinated with KUBARK, regarding implementation of CRA in the recent Cuban crisis. CINCLANT requested that he be informed as to the status of command arrangements between KUBARK Forces participating in the operation and the military commands. JBTRUTH's answer embodied the

general thoughts noted at paragraph 3 above and was to the effect that provisions have been made in an exchange of memoranda for institution of the CRA when the need exists. CINCLINT was directed to notify JBTRUTH when in his opinion implementation of CRA was necessary. He was also told that the final decision would be influenced by national level requirements for intelligence and related clandestine activities.

b. Since Chief, KUBARK and Chairman, JBTRUTH, have reached agreement on implementation of CRA and activation of the KUBARK Force in Military type contingency situations, as distinguished from plans involving political alternatives, Senior War Planners must ensure that their military support plans are in consonance with the new agreements. A major point in this regard is the preparation of plans which support military counterinsurgency operations. We believe that such contingencies can be related to a wide spectrum of actions ranging from utilization of military personnel and their equipment in civic action roles up to introduction of large increments of combat type personnel to conduct operations. In preparing supporting plans for such contingencies each KUBARK planner has a similar wide choice of designating the KUBARK elements to support such operations if CRA is implemented.

5. Activation of KUBARK Elements:

a. The designation of KUBARK elements to be activated as part of the KUBARK Force for support of military contingency operations should be the result of a careful analysis of the military objectives, tasks and missions, scope of military activities envisioned, the military forces which have been assigned to the operation (Force Tabs) and, lastly, the political situation expected to prevail in the objective area at the time the operation plan is implemented.

b. A point for emphasis is that, if by Presidential declaration the authority for safeguarding ODYOKI activities within the area of operations remains vested in political representatives and CRA is implemented, with its inherent provision for activation of a KUBARK Force, the KUBARK elements could well be subjected to direction from two authorities. Such a situation would be operationally unsound.

c. In view of the foregoing, KUBARK Senior War Planners should be definitive in their force tabs and may exclude from the KUBARK Force planned for activation to support military operations some KUBARK elements which in peacetime are located within their geographical areas.

When this has been accomplished, KUBARK's responsibilities will have been recognized both in support of military commanders in anticipation of CRA as well as in support of continuing operational activity responsive to national policies. In turn, each military commander will be aware, during the planning phase of operations, of those elements of KUBARK which will make up the KUBARK Force and pass to his operational command upon implementation of CRA.

6. Headquarters will continue to advise you of new developments regarding this subject which arise from subsequent exchanges of memoranda.

COORDINATION: (IN DRAFT)

<u>AF</u>	<u>28 Nov. 62</u>	Date
<u>EE</u>	<u>3 Dec. 62</u>	This draft includes EE comments.
<u>FE</u>	<u>28 Nov. 62</u>	Date
<u>NE</u>	<u>28 Nov. 62</u>	Date
<u>SR</u>	<u>29 Nov. 62</u>	Date
<u>WE</u>	<u>28 Nov. 62</u>	Date
<u>SOD</u>	<u>3 Dec. 62</u>	Deferred to CA position
<u>CA</u>	<u>3 Dec. 62</u>	This draft includes CA comments.
<u>SPA/DDS</u>	<u>28 Nov. 62</u>	This draft includes SPA/DDS comments on paragraph 6 of old draft.
<u>WHA/PL</u>	<u>3 Dec. 62</u>	

TRW

3 Dec. 62